In late July Schroeder disseminated guidelines for »deterrent« and »expiatory« measures which had been prepared by the administrative staff 6 . The guidelines imposed many restrictions: special care was to be taken to investigate the facts of any incident, for »measures unjustly enacted damage German prestige« (Maßnahmen, die zu Unrecht getroffen sind, schaden dem deutschen Ansehen . . .); reprisal shooting was to occur only for actions committed after the hostages had been arrested and sufficient warning had been given; a close connection between the hostages and the perpetrators had to exist; and the decision of the military commander was needed in every case. However, the guidelines also permitted measures against the population of a location if they made themselves »co-responsible« (mitverantwortlich) by facilitating sabotage committed by others, by passively resisting German investigation, or by offering fertile soil to anti-German activity. Thus in addition to arrested communists and the Jewish hostage pool from which reprisal victims had been selected so far, Serbians on the spot deemed co-responsible were now vulnerable. The first use of this new reprisal policy occurred on July 27, when Serbian police were forced at gunpoint to shoot 81 harvest workers rounded up in the fields near the site of an ambushed German car 7 .
As German police measures proved inadequate in stemming the growth of the partisan movement, the occupation authorities sought a more effective counter-insurgency policy. Field Marshal List visited Serbia on July 21-2 and ordered the troops of Bader's 65th Corps to take a more active combat role 8 . The OKW exhorted more intensive repression; the military commander was expected to »burn Out the troublemakers through the most brutal actions and sharpest reprisals« (durch brutales Einschreiten und schärfste Repressalien die Unruheherde ausbrennt) and to hang, not shoot, saboteurs 9 . In contrast to greater military involvement or more draconic reprisals, a number of local German officials of the army, military administration, police, and Foreign Office preferred expanded police measures, with particular emphasis on a strengthened and better-armed Serbian police 10 . German policy in Serbia would in practice embrace all of these options but vacillate in emphasis as none initially brought success. On July 27 Schroeder died of injuries suffered in a plane crash and was replaced by another Luftwaffe commander, General Danckelmann. On August 2, Danckelmann informed List that he intended to proceed in the future primarily with police actions and use troops only in exceptional cases. The following day he foolishly announced that he was »master of the situation« and needed no reinforcements 11 . He was quickly stripped of his illusions, but his subsequent requests for more police and a full division were both turned down 12 . The lack of reinforcements for a military solution was compounded by the imminent collapse of the Serbian police upon whom so many of the Germans in Serbia had hoped to shift the main burden of anti-partisan operations. Illequipped and demoralized, the Serbian police could no longer be relied upon to carry the burden of pacification 13 .
If the forces of the German military and Serbian police seemed increasingly inadequate, the reprisal policy begun on local initiative and then emphatically endorsed by the OKW was proving not only inadequate but counter-productive. Numerous German documents make clear that Schroeder's initial injunction to avoid injustices was a dead letter and that German reprisal policy was not contributing to pacification. Instead it was driving peaceful, politically indifferent, and loyal portions of the Serbian population into bitterness and despair and ultimately into the ranks of the insurgents 14 ; Despite numerous warnings to this effect, draconic reprisal measures remained an essential part of German strategy. When Danckelmann ordered the formation of mobile pursuit companies in mid-August, List's Chief of Staff, Hermann Foertsch, emphasized the need not only for mobility but also for such measures as hostage shootings, hangings, and threats to local authorities, family members, and landlords of suspected insurgents 15 . This was not empty rhetoric. For an ambush of a German police car in Skela two days later, 50 communists were hanged in Belgrade, 15 villagers were shot for not reporting the presence of the partisans, and the entire village of 350 houses was burned to the ground. When Kiessel objected that no investigation had been made to ascertain the facts, Gravenhorst referred to a specific authorization from Foertsch to proceed with such severe measures 16 .
The pace of arbitary reprisals did not slacken, nor did their effectiveness increase. Noting that »in the Balkans life counts for nothing«, the German army historian General Wißhaupt subsequently wrote: »Even with the most unrestricted reprisal measures -up until the end of August a total of approximately 1,000 communists and Jews had been shot or publicly hanged and the houses of the guilty burned down -it was not possible to restrain the continual growth of the armed revolt.«
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It was General Bader who analyzed the failure of all three German policies in the most unflinching terms. Reprisal policy only played into the hands of the communists. Ambushed troops cried for revenge and shot people found in the fields. In most cases the guilty had long fled, the innocent suffered, and hitherto loyal Serbs went over to the partisans out of fear or bitterness 18 . The Serbian police were increasingly reproached for fighting against their countrymen and could no longer be relied upon.
As for the German troops, no great success could be expected. Each division had only two regiments, no armoured vehicles, and trucks so bad they could not leave the road. Individual battalions were 50-60 kilometers apart, and so weakened by essential guard duty that only 80-90 men could be scraped together for pursuit commandos that were totally inadequate to cover the territory assigned. Quite simply, »The area is too great! The troops employed too weak!«
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Drastic measures were required, but the Germans in Belgrade and List in Greece advocated contrasting solutions based on starkly different interpretations of the nature of the partisan movement. Germans in Serbia emphasized two aspects of the insurgency. On the one hand, there were many causes for the inexorable growth of Serbian unrest. In addition to German reprisal policy, the feeling of Serbian national humiliation now compounded by the possible loss of the Banat to Hungary, the massive influx of penniless and maltreated Serbian refugees, the German toleration of Croatian atrocities, the high unemployment and food shortages, the long tradition of guerrilla resistance to foreign occupation, and a general sentiment of Slavic solidarity with Russia all created fertile soil for anti-German sentiment. On the other hand, however, these analyses noted that so far the communists were the main force behind the insurgency. Though they draped their movement in nationalist garb, the Serbian nationalist circles, including the Chetniks, had hitherto remained aloof and deliberately avoided military confrontation with the Germans. The population at large still rejected communism, even if it did not cooperate with the German troops against the bands 20 . It was of the utmost importance not to drive the communists and Serbian nationalists into a united front; rather Germany must work with the latter against the former. Thus in late August, with the support of Turner, Benzler, Neuhausen, and Bader's Chief of Staff, Col. Erich Kewisch, Danckelmann asked the former Serbian Minister of Defense, Milan Nedic, a popular figure untainted by corruption and a strong anti-communist with a pro-German record, to become president of a new Serbian government replacing the now defunct provisional government. It was desperately hoped that Nedic would have the popularity and prestige to mobilize anticommunist sentiment and win the support of wider circles of the Serbian population 21 .
The action was taken so precipitously that neither List nor higher officials in Berlin were consulted. List was not pleased. In short, List's behavior vis-ä-vis Serbia in September 1941 was not typical of the rest of his career nor of his character. Despite his claim at Nürnberg that the infamous September 5th guidelines must have been an OKW formulation that he had passed on without remembering them, they were his own 32 . They were not the reflection of OKW orders imposed from above nor of specifically Nazi convictions. Rather they reflected the military frustrations of a professional soldier with little political sense. A strict disciplinarian with a paternalistic concern for the welfare of his own troops, List found the insurgency and its »insidious« methods an outrageous affront to his sense of order and decency. The insurgents and the unruly Serbian people from whom they sprang had to be punished. Whatever affection and respect List felt for the Greeks as a people of an ancient culture, he considered the Serbs in a quite different light. »They are far more passionate, hot blooded and more cruel« because of their history. »The individual in Serbia is obviously like every other peasant, under normal conditions, but as soon as differences arise, then caused by the hot blood in their veins, the cruelty caused by hundreds of years of Turkish domination errupts.« 33 Because List had a stereotyped image of the Serbs, he felt they could be disciplined only with measures commensurate with their own violent nature. He had no patience for those like Turner, Benzler, and Danckelmann who wished to place greater reliance on Serbian collaboration.
List, and indeed almost every German officer in the Balkans, was tormented by another concern -the damage to the prestige and image of the German army caused by its inability to cope with the partisan tactics. This apprehension for the Ansehen of the German army is a recurring theme of the documents of this period. The partisan success was more than just an embarrassment to their professional pride. If not checked, the increasing display of German military impotence would hearten Germany's enemies and stimulate yet further resistance that could snowball into disaster. In early September, when List fired off his exhortations for greater terror, this was no longer a fanciful prospect. The Chetniks were now entering the battle against the Germans, swept up in the wave of partisan success, and List's image of a national insurgency was becoming a self-fulfilling prophecy. In all of August the German Wehrmacht had suffered 30 dead, 23 wounded, and 1 missing in Serbia 34 . Suddenly, on the first of September, one hundred men of a Regional Defense Battalion were captured at Losnica, and three days later another 175 were captured in a breakout attempt from Krupanj 35 . Thus List was reacting to two major setbacks of unprecedented proportions in the guerrilla war which clearly demonstrated that the thinly-stretched German troops in Serbia were not only impotent to suppress sabotage and ambush but were now threatened with piecemeal defeat and capture.
As the German position continued to deteriorate, even the proponents of the Nedic experiment admitted its failure, particularly when 450 Serbian police sent to Sabac refused to fight and Nedic himself confessed to Benzler that the only remaining solution was to crush the uprising with German forces alone 36 . List now moved to remedy what he considered the »intolerable chain of command« in Serbia, in which a »vain« and »superficial« Luftwaffe general, who had been seduced by the political calculations of Turner and Benzler, outranked the Wehrmacht troop commander. He proposed the unification of territorial and troop command under an »older, wellschooled general who has had front line experience«, and proposed 18th Corps commander General Franz Böhme as »especially suitable for this position« 37 . Presumably
Böhme, a general in the Austrian army before the Anschluß, would have few inhibitions about repression in Serbia 38 . List also reiterated his request for a frontline division. Both requests were quickly granted. The 342nd division was dispatched from France, and Böhme was appointed Plenipotentiary Commanding General in Serbia 39 .
Upon his arrival in Belgrade on September 18, Böhme found Turner and Bader's Chief of Staff, Kewisch, fervent converts to List's call for »increased pressure on the population«. A major punitive expedition by the 342nd division was already being planned for the Sava Bend region around Sabac, a particularly dense area of partisan activity. Both Kewisch and Turner urged that not only the men but also the women and children be driven from the area to deprive the insurgents of their food supply. As Turner wrote, »The entire population had to be punished, not only the men«, (Die Gesamtheit der Bevölkerung muß also gestraft werden, nicht nur die Männer) for such »apparent« (scheinbare) cruelty was the only means to bring the people to their senses 40 .
Between September 22 and 25 Böhme issued his orders for the Sava Bend Strafexpedition 41 . The premise was that the population in its entirety had joined the insurgency.
Through ruthless measures, a horrifying example had to be made that would become known through-out Serbia immediately. Men between 14 and 70 were to be placed in a concentration camp at Jarak near Mitrovica. The female population was to be driven off into the Cer mountains by every possible means. All inhabitants who participated in resistance or in whose houses weapons or ammunition were found or who attempted to flee were to be shot and their houses burned down. In a message to the troops, Böhme exhorted: Your mission lies in . . . the country in which German blood flowed in 1914 through the treachery of Serbs, men and women. You are avengers of these dead. An intimidating example must be created for the whole of Serbia, which must hit the whole population most severely. Anyone who wishes to rule charitably sins against the lives of his comrades. On October 5, the day after his Order for 2,100 reprisal executions, Böhme received a further communication from Keitel and a counter-insurgency directive from List as well. The Keitel directive departed from his previous simplistic assertion that all resistance was communist in origin, and now required military commanders in Occupied areas always to have on hand hostage pools of nationalists and middle-class democrats as well, so that in case of attack reprisal victims could be chosen appropriately 55 .
List's directive was in response to Böhme's earlier request to deport to Germany all the interned Serbs at Sabac, for he opposed either holding them indefinitely or releasing them. List vetoed deportations and ordered that while those caught in battle were to be executed immediately, men merely encountered in the area of operations were to be investigated. Those proven to be partisans were to be executed, those suspected were to be held as hostages and shot in case of partisan activity in the area, and those not suspected of änti-German activity were to be released. Böhme's staff noted that List's directive was not entirely in accord with Keitel's earlier directive of September 16, which ordered the »harshest measures« 56 . While in theory Keitel's and List's directives were not incompatible, in practice they would prove to be. Future events would show that if prisoners had to be investigated to spare the innocent, the ratio would be unobtainable; if the ratio was to be met, screening of prisoners would have to be dispensed with.
Böhme's staff proceeded to develop a general reprisal policy. Drafted by Faulmüller, initialed by Pemsel, and signed by Böhme, it was issued to all units on October 10, 1941.
In Serbia it is necessary because of the »Balkan mentality« and the great expansion of the communist and nationalist-camouflaged insurgency movements, to carry out the orders of the OKW in the sharpest form. One hundred hostages were to be shot for each German soldier or ethnic German killed and 50 for each wounded. The executions were to be carried out by army troops, preferrably by the units suffering the losses 57 .
This reprisal policy of Böhme, Pemsel and Faulmüller was not simply a minimal compliance with the Keitel guidelines. Not only did they adopt the maximum suggested ratio of 100-1 rather than the minimum of 50-1, but they also explicitly included »all Jews«, a group which Keitel had never mentioned. Why did they do this? The German military commanders in Serbia had long accepted the identification or at least the natural combination of communist and Jew. The very first reprisal execution in late June had been carried out against »communists and Jews«, and by the end of the summer the military reported the reprisal execution of over 1,000 »communists and Jews«. Böhme, Pemsel and Faulmüller were not breaking new ground. While many officers simply may have accepted the communist-Jewish identification as an unquestioned and »self-evident« tenet of Nazi ideology, a narrowly professional and unideological mode of thinking among other officers led to the same results. It was obvious to every German officer that, given Nazi Germany's policies toward the Jews in occupied countries, they would assuredly be among Germany's enemies. As Field Marshal List stated at his trial: »I can well understand from the point of view of the Jews that they worked against the Germans and that they combined with the Communists. I say I can well understand that on the basis of events which had occurred.« 58 Professional soldiers stood ready to defend their country against its enemies; they did not stand in judgment of or make their loyalty conditional upon the policies of their government which created those enemies. As long as the anti-Jewish measures in Serbia were perceived and construed as military measures against Germany's enemies, it did not require nazified zealots (though surely such were not lacking), merely conscientious and politically obtuse professional soldiers to carry them out 59 .
The inclusion of the Jews did not strike the Germans in Belgrade as extraordinary or unusual. On the contrary it was a course of action that must have seemed almost natural and obvious. ... in the last eight days I had 2,000 Jews and 200 gypsies shot in accordance with the ratio 1:100 for bestially murdered German soldiers, and a further 2,200, likewise almost all Jews, will be shot in the next eight days. This is not a pretty business. At any rate, it has to be, if only to make clear what it means even to attack a German soldier, and, for the rest, the Jewish question solves itself most quickly in this way. Actually, it is false, if one is to be precise about it, that for murdered Germans -on whose account the ratio 1:100 should really be born by Serbs -100 Jews are shot instead; but the Jews we had in camps -after all, they too are Serb nationals, and besides, they have to disappear 69 . (. . . habe ich dann in den letzten 8 Tagen 2000 Juden und 200 Zigeuner erschießen lassen nach der Quote 1:100 für bestialisch hingemordete deutsche Soldaten und weitere 2200, ebenfalls fast nur Juden, werden in den nächsten 8 Tagen erschossen. Eine schöne Arbeit ist das nicht! Aber immerhin muß es sein, um einmal den Leuten klar zu machen, was es heißt, einen deutschen Soldaten überhaupt nur anzugreifen und zum andern löst sich die Judenfrage auf die Weise am schnellsten. Es ist ja eigentlich falsch, wenn man es genau nimmt, daß für ermordete Deutsche, bei denen ja das Verhältnis 1:100 zu Lasten der Serben gehen müßte, nun 100 Juden erschossen werden, aber die haben wir nun mal im Lager gehabt, -schließlich sind es auch serbische St[aats-]A[ngehörige] und sie müssen ja auch verschwinden.)
If Turner was convinced that the Jews had to disappear, he was at least vaguely aware of the incongruity of shooting Jews in retaliation for the actions of Serbian partisans. Moreover, Turner's preferred solution for the disappearance of the Jews had been deportation to Rumania or elsewhere, and suddenly he saw the opportunity to press for this solution once more when Foreign Office Jewish expert Franz Rademacher and one of Eichmann's deputies, Friedrich Suhr, arrived in Belgrade on October 18 70 .
In September both Undersecretary Martin Luther in the Foreign Office and Reinhard Heydrich of the RSHA had been annoyed by Benzler's persistent requests (instigated by Turner) to deport the Serbian Jews. On October 4 Luther and Heydrich met and decided to send representatives to Belgrade to see if the Serbian Jewish question »could be settled on the spot« (an Ort und Stelle erledigt werden könne) 71 . Upon arrival Rademacher and Suhr discovered that the desired local solution was already underway. When Rademacher met with Turner on October 19, however, the latter emphatically urged the deportation of the remaining 2,000 male Jews interned in Belgrade. This was not a view shared by Einsatzgruppe leader Wilhelm Fuchs, who noted that the problem of the male Jews could be settled within a week by having them shot as hostages by the army. Already the number of incarcerated Jews did not suffice to fill the quota. On October 20 Fuchs, Turner, Rademacher, and Suhr met together. Faced with Rademacher's and Suhr's renewed veto of deportations, Turner raised no objection to Fuchs' proposal to have the Jews shot within the framework of army reprisals. Rademacher reported: »The male Jews will be shot by the end of the week . . ,«
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As the fate of the male Jews in Serbia was being sealed in Belgrade, events to the south of the capital in the towns of Kraljevo and Kragujevac were building to a crisis that would force the Germans to reappraise their reprisal policy. The 717th division of Major General Hoffmann was responsible for this region, and the reprisal order of October 10 was to him a veritable hunting license. When units of his division suffered casualties in an attack on Kraljevo on October 15 and 16, they went on a house-tohouse search through the city, and by the evening of the 17th had shot 1,736 men and 19 »communist women« 73 .
The Kraljevo massacre was shortly followed by an even larger one in Kragujevac, where Major König, a bitter critic of »soft« measures, was in command 74 . When German units returned from a punitive expedition to Gorni Milanovac with 133 hostages but 9 dead and 26 wounded of their own, Hoffmann ordered immediate retaliation. Sixty-six communists and Jews and 53 prison inmates were seized, and König prepared to seize the remaining people to meet his quota of 2,300 from the population at large. The Kreiskommandant, Captain Bischofshausen, insisted that the population of the city had never caused a single German casualty. He urged that the reprisals be taken against the »communist-infested« villages in the area. König agreed, and on October 19 shot 245 men in Grosnica and 182 in Mackovac, which left the Germans still far short of their quota. Thus on the evening of October 19, König informed Bischofshausen of his intention to carry out the round-up of men in Kragujevac. On the following day 159 communists, Jews and prison inmates were shot, and 3,200 inhabitants of the city, including the students of the local high school, were seized. Mass shootings were carried out on October 21 until the quota of 2,300 had been met 75 .
List and Böhme had reaped the whirlwind sown by their constant incitements to »ruthless« terror. The two massacres at Kraljevo and Kragujevac had immediate repercussions, especially as the entire Serbian workforce of an airplane factory in Kraljevo producing for the German war effort were among the victims. Walther noted in his summary report over »the shooting of Jews and gypsies« that: ___ At first my soldiers were not impressed. On the second day, however, it became obvious that one or another did not have the nerve to carry out shootings over a long period of time. It is my personal impression that during the shooting one does not have psychological blocks. They set in, however, after several days one reflects about it on evenings alone.
A week later, after Walther had had some days to reflect, he was ordered to carry out yet a third execution. Afterwards he went to his battalion commander and pleaded release from his assignment, because his nerves were finished and he dreamed of the shootings at night. The next execution was given to a different company commander. Presumably, the 64th Reserve Police Battalion also shot its 600 hostages, as promised by Turner 83 . / By the end of October, as the second and final round of Judenerschießungen was underway, the tide of battle in Serbia had definitely turned in favor of the Germans. German assessments noted the breaking-up of the insurgent movement, the flight of the communists to Croatia, the turnabout of the Chetniks who now began to fight the communists and to ask the Germans for arms, and the increasingly effective and reliable performance of the Serbian police 84 . The Germans were quite convinced that their reprisal measures had made a major contribution to their success 85 . Yet the reprisal quotas were no longer enforced with the earlier severity and exactness. For instance the 342nd division reported a shortfall of 3250 reprisal executions on both October 30 and November 11, stating that they had no prisoners available 86 . Though 1,345 reprisal shootings were carried out in November and an additional 984 in December, this still left the Germans far behind in fulfilling the quota 87 . With random reprisals excluded and the supply of Jews exhausted, the quotas simply could not be met. When General Bader replaced Böhme on December 5, he had a statistical study prepared of the reprisal program. It concluded that at least 11,164 reprisal shootings had been carried out as of December 5, 1941, though this figure was admittedly too low, for the compilers of the report had not received data from the 718th division (which had carried out the Sabac shootings in mid-October) and several other units. Calculating German casualties and adjusting for partisans reported killed in battle, the report concluded that there was still a staggering shortfall of 20,174 reprisals 88 . On December 22 Bader issued a lowered reprisal quota, stipulating ratios of 50 and 25 to 1, for dead and wounded respectively 89 . But still to be taken as reprisal prisoners were those who »because of their attitude and behavior were earmarked to atone for German lives, for example communists captured without weapons, gypsies, Jews, criminals, and so forth« (auf Grund ihrer Einstellung und ihres Verhaltens zur Sühne für deutsche Menschenleben bestimmt sind, ζ. B. nicht mit der Waffe betroffene Kommunisten, Zigeuner, Juden, Verbrecher u. dergl. 90 ). Even after the male Jews had been murdered, the Germans could not refrain from counting them as a group who, because of their presumed attitude and behavior, could be automatically counted as reprisal prisoners doomed to death. Thus if the Germans did not fulfill their reprisal quota, it was because insufficient numbers of communists could be found, the political cost of randomly killing Serbs was too high, and the supply of »expendable« Jews and gypsies was exhausted. There is very little reason to believe the quota would not have been met, if enough Jews had been available.
In conclusion, the mass murder of the male Jews in Serbia was primarily accomplished by the German Wehrmacht, though it certainly received willing help from the Security and Order Police of the SS. This mass murder was the culmination of a process in which the German occupation authorities had first singled the Jews out for special persecution in the spring of 1941 and subjected them to disproportionate reprisals and internment in the summer. Once the partisan resistance drove the Germans to inflict upon themselves the obligation to fulfill the maximum reprisal quota, all interned Serbs were at high risk but the interned male Jews were doomed. The German military could conceive of innocent Serbs but not innocent Jews. They accepted the fact that not all Serbs were communists, and thus perceived the political expediency of screening Serbian prisoners and releasing those beyond suspicion, especially after the catastrophe of the Kraljevo and Kragujevac massacres. But it was axiomatic that all Jews were anti-German and thus a legitimate target of a professional organization dedicated to defending Germany against its enemies. They were moreover an expendable group whose elimination entailed no politically disadvantageous repercussions. The local SS forces, Fuchs and belatedly Turner, and Berlin, through its travelling representatives Rademacher and Suhr, may have given an additional push in late October to finish the job. But they were pushing on an open door. The policy of killing all the adult male Jews in Serbia as hostages had been articulated by Böhme, Pemsel and Faulmüller already in early October and was reaffirmed in principle by Bader in late December. Thus a commonality of interest had emerged between the Wehrmacht, SS, and Foreign Office to kill these Jews even before the Final Solution to murder all the Jews of Europe was in operation. When such events could happen, it is no wonder that, when instituted, the European-wide genocide program met with no meaningful resistance from any organized segment of German society and certainly not from the Wehrmacht. Following the pre-trail investigation of a German officer charged with shooting Jews in Serbia, a post-war German court ruled that Wehrmacht reprisal policy had not been criminal, even when the victims were Jews. It ruled that the army had been duped by the SS into shooting Jews unwittingly. As no »base« (niedrige), i.e. racial, motive was therefore involved on the part of army personnel, they had not committed murder as defined by German law and charges were dropped. Another German court investigating a similar case seized the precedent with alacrity and halted its own investigation, and other pending cases were also not taken up. 
